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Challenges from public procurement
Hans Morten Haugen, Oslo
Procurement processes with tender competition have been a preferred approach for engag-
ing service providers in Norway. Even if the present Norwegian government finds it “essen-
tial that competition becomes an integral part of all public activity,” a simultaneous push for
preserving the welfare mix of Norway has occurred, with public, non-profit, and for-profit
actors.What specificmeasures are being undertaken to preserve the non-profit actors? How
have the Norwegian authorities sought to utilize the policy space that the EU/EEA (Euro-
pean Economic Area) provides? The article concludes that Norway has a wide policy space
for providing public health and welfare services through non-profit actors, but there is dis-
agreement between Norway and the European Surveillance Authority (ESA) concerning
which health and social welfare services that represent exercise of official authority. Pro-
curement processes relating to such services can be reserved to non-profit actors.
Key words: EU, non-economic services, non-profit actors, Norway, welfare providers
Within the Scandinavian context, Norway presently has less public procure-
ment in healthcare and social services than Sweden, but more than Denmark,
which is reflected in the approximate share of healthcare and social services
provided by non-profit actors (2013 figures; for-profit actors in parenthe-
sis): Sweden: 1.9% (22.5%); Norway: 8.7% (16.6%); Denmark: 7.1% (9.2%).1
Comparative figures for the non-profit sector in several continental European
countries lie around 20–25%. In Norway, the highest share of non-profit ac-
tors is in the drug rehabilitation services (35%).2
The term applied inNorwegian is “ideell”; this article applies the term “non-
profit.”3 Interestingly, the Guidelines for Public Procurement uses the term
1 Adapted from Sivesind, K.H. (2016), ‘Endring av fordelingen mellom ideelle, kommersielle
og offentlige velferdstjenester i Skandinavia’, in K.H. Sivesind (ed.) Mot en ny skandinavisk
velferdsmodell? Konsekvenser av ideell, kommersiell og offentlig tjenesteyting for aktivt med-
borgerskap, ISF Rapport 2016:1, 26–31 (who includes education).
2 Myrset Hatlebakk, I. (2014), Rusbehandling – mye i privat regi, Samfunnsspeilet Vol. 28, No.
2, 16–19. A figure on the share of non-profit actors in child welfare services of 40% (Public
Commission on Pension Obligations for Non-Profit Actors (2016), NOU 2016:12: Ideell op-
prydding. Statlig dekning av ideelle organisasjoners historiske pensjonskostnader, 24–25) does
not correspond to other (lower) figures on non-profit actors’ share of child welfare services.
3 There is no official definition of the term ‘ideell, but see European Surveillance Author-
ity (ESA) (2017), Decision No. 154/17/COL, Case No. 77606, 10–11, available online at
https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/39ccee1c40294130a78bf8839988c153/77606—
decision—complaint-against-norway-concerning-unl2120060.pdf. As revealed by VG (2017),
‘Ekspert: Fyrlyktas hundremillioners-avtale var ulovlig’ (9 May), one foundation that has
received 50 million Euro since 2012 has been found by the Office of the City Recorder in Oslo
(Oslo Byfogdembete) not to be have a non-profit basis (16–147748TVI-OBYF), resulting
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What policy space for diaconal institutions? Challenges frompublic procurement 17
“humanistic and social services,”4 as do theGuidelines for Public Procurement
of Healthcare and Social Services.5 The phrase first appeared in the 2006 Re-
port to Parliament on amendments in the public procurement law,6 followed
by the phrase “humanistic and social tasks.”7 It is interesting that the former
Government of Norway applied “humanistic” as a value basis when this con-
cept is primarily associated with one Norwegian organization.
Notwithstanding this terminology, all Norwegian Governments have been
enthusiastic about the role of non-profit organizations, knowing that this sec-
tor is constituted primarily by diaconal organizations. With respect to the de-
mands of the European Economic Area (EAA), which links Norway to the EU
without its being a full member, the parties have different strategies, however,
as this article shows.
In this article, we first explain the particular Norwegian policy space, in-
cluding how it operated until the new EU directive on public procurement
(2014/24/EU) came into force on 1 January 2017. Second, we outline recent
Norwegian efforts to strengthen the role of the non-profit sector. Third, we
present the alternatives to public procurement, which may be found either in
the “Exclusions” chapter of the EU directive as well as in four documents by
the EU Commission seeking to clarify the terms “state aid” and “services of
general interest”: a 2016 Notice, a 2012 Decision, and two 2011 Communica-
tions.8 Fourth, we analyze the flexibilities applying to “social and other specific
services” of the 2014 directive, including its influence on the revision of the
Act on Public Procurement in the Norwegian Parliament in June 2016. Fifth,
the article concludes by asking whether the policy space has been adequately
applied.
in Oslo municipality’s ending its cooperation. The Norwegian Foundations Authority was
earlier asked for an assessment, but merely said that being a foundation does not imply a
non-profit basis, and did not analyze the foundation’s mandate and management. An expert
on public procurement notes that Fyrlykta’s statutes does not specify how the foundation will
manage a surplus.
4 Norwegian Government (2013), Veileder til reglene om offentlige anskaffelser, Oslo, 99, 101.
5 Norwegian Agency for Public Management and eGovernment [Difi] (2013), Veileder for an-
skaffelser av helse- og sosialtjenester, Difi Veileder 2013:2, Oslo, 23.
6 Norwegian Government (2006), Ot.prp. nr. 62 (2005–2006) Om lov om endringer i lov 16. juli
1999 nr. 69 om offentlige anskaffelser, 23.
7 Norwegian Government 2006, Ot. prp. 62, 23.
8 EU Commission (2016), Commission Notice on the notion of State aid; EU Commission
(2012), CommissionDecision 2012/21/EU on state aid; EUCommission (2011), Proposal for a
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on public procurement, COM (2011)
896 final (“Communication I”); EU Commission (2011), A Quality Framework for Services of
General Interest in Europe, COM(2011) 900 final (“Communication II”). The article does not
analyze the EU directive on concession contracts (2014/23/EU), even if it applies to services.
Concession contracts have No. specifications on the amount of services to be provided. Direc-
tive 2014/23/EU specifies in preambular paragraph 53 that it allows for exclusion “services that
have a limited cross-border dimension, such as certain social, health, or educational services.”
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18 Hans Morten Haugen
The overall research questions this article seeks to answer are thus: What
policy space is available for giving preference to value-based, non-profit organi-
zations under Norwegian and EEA law? And to what extent is this policy space
being utilized in the context of public procurement?
In addition to sifting through reports from debates in the Norwegian par-
liaments, party and governmental programs, public commission reports and
legislative material, I held interviews with five persons from diaconal organi-
zations in Norway. I interviewed two Secretary-Generals in two of the largest
Norwegian diaconal organizations: Crux (previously Kirkens Sosialtjeneste;
18 institutions or programs; close to 500 employees) and Blå Kors Norge (Blue
CrossNorway; 50 institutions or programs; around 1100 employees), andwith
the Director of Social Service and the Negotiator of the Norwegian Salvation
Army (57 social institutions and programs; excluding the Fretex second-hand
shops, including Iceland and Faroe Islands; almost 2500 employees, includ-
ing those in Fretex shops), and the Special Advisor to the Secretary-General in
Church City Mission Oslo (40 institutions or programs, 1200 employees).
1. Space for diaconal institutions in a competitive Norway?
Diaconal actors have been pioneers in developing welfare services, as men-
tioned by a Public Commission that submitted its report in August 2016: “The
history of the Norwegian welfare state is to a large extent a history about non-
profit organizations.”9 Moreover, in the mid-20th century diaconal organiza-
tions advocated for a greater role of the government and municipalities in the
provision of healthcare and social services, even during a period inwhich some
bishops in Church of Norway were warning of a too-dominant state.10
The Norwegian government (2013–2017), that was reelected in 2017, con-
sisting of the Conservative Party and the (right-wing populist) Progress Party,
said in its governmental platform:
the production of welfare services does not differ greatly from other services. Competi-
tion encourages value creation and better public services, as well as more effective imple-
mentation. It is therefore essential that competition become an integral part of all public
activity.11
9 Public Commission on pension obligations for non-profit actors (2016), NOU 2016:12: Ideell
opprydding. Statlig dekning av ideelle organisasjoners historiske pensjonskostnader, 40 (own
translation; all translations from Norwegian are by the author).
10 Tønnessen, A. (2000), Et trygt og godt hjem for alle? Kirkelederes kritikk av velferdsstaten etter
1945, Oslo.
11 Norwegian Government (2013), Political platform for a government formed by the Conserva-
tive Party and the Progress Party, Sundvolden, 7 October 2013, 36; see also 2 and 12.
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What policy space for diaconal institutions? Challenges frompublic procurement 19
Moreover, the government will “expand the use of private and non-profit re-
sources for the provision of public welfare services.”12 These formulations and
the documentation of how some of the private actors are organized and have
fared13 have led to higher awareness over the last years. Critics of commer-
cialization complain that the use of the term “private” diffuses the differences
between the commercial and the non-profit actors.14
The largest political party in Norway, the Labour Party, was earlier reluc-
tant to express strong opposition to commercial welfare, as illustrated by this
formulation in the 2013–2017 party program: “Non-profit organizations and
other private welfare providers are a useful supplement to the public offer-
ings.”15 No principal distinction is made between “non-profit organizations”
and “other private welfare providers.” This wording is not included in the
2017–2021 party program, which rather states: “Where the Government has
to procure services, non-profit organisations will, as a rule, be preferred to
commercial ones.”16
Moreover, when the Labour Party won power in the largest Norwegianmu-
nicipalities after the 2015 election, the respective city authorities initiated pro-
cesses to end contracts with commercial welfare providers, primarily in the
realm of nursing homes. When the (red-green) Oslo Municipality announced
a procurement process in child welfare services exclusively for non-profit ac-
tors inMay 2016, this was objected by seven for-profit actors, bringing the case
before the Office of the City Recorder in Oslo (Oslo Byfogdembete), which
they lost.17
12 Norwegian government, Political platform, 36.
13 Herning, L. (2015), Velferdsprofitørene – om penger, makt og propaganda i de norske
velferdstjenestene. Oslo; Herning, L. (2012), Konkurranseutsatte sykehjem i Norge, Oslo;
documenting how 33 of 38 nursing homes operating under a municipal contract have
been sold or restructured during the contract period; for an alternative perspective,
see Gauden-Kolbeinstveit, L. (2011), Reaksjonært om velferdsstaten, available online at
www.minervanett.no/reaksjonaert-om-velferdsstaten
14 Herning, L (2015), ‘Velferdsprofitørenes strategi’, in Dagbladet (19 June).
15 Norwegian Labour Party (2013), Moving Norway forward. The Programme of the Norwegian
Labour Party
2013–2017, 19.
16 Norwegian Labour Party (2017), Party manifesto 2017–2021. Everyone participates , 77. The
quote is taken from the section “Child welfare”; for other sections highlighting non-profit ac-
tors, see 19 (‘Make provision for non-profit organisations to play a greater role as public sec-
tor service providers’), 34 (‘non-profit organisations … an important supplement… ’) & 41
(‘Strengthen the cooperation with non-profit organisations… ’).
17 Oslo Byfogdembete (2016), Aberia Ung and six others, v. Oslo Municipality, Agency for Child
and Family Welfare Services, 16–126305TVI-OBYF. The case was decided based on the pre-
vious Act and Regulation on public procurement; the new Act is in force as of 1 January 2017,
with further regulations. The Byfogdembete is an integral part of the Norwegian court system,
with possibilities for appeals. Potential use of force as exercise of official authority is central to
the decision by Oslo Byfogdembete.
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20 Hans Morten Haugen
NHO Service (Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise) brought its objec-
tions to another procurement process, initiated by the Directorate for Chil-
dren, Youth and Family Affairs and reserved for non-profit actors, before the
European Surveillance Authority (ESA) – and the ESA in September 2017
ruled in favor of Norway.18 Also a previous decision from ESA has found that
the Norwegian approach to non-profit actors (see below) was in compliance
with the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services of Ar-
ticles 31 and 36 of the EAA Agreement (Articles 49 and 56 of the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union, TFEU).19
All these decisions were based on EUDirective 2004/18/EC, which has been
replaced by Directive 2014/24/EU. Hence, while approving of the exemption
in the previous Norwegian Regulation, ESA states explicitly that the latest de-
cision, taken after the adoption of Directive 2014/24/EU, applies only to the
previous Directive.20 Moreover, ESA said that while the professionals in child
welfare institutions represented an “exercise of official authority… ”,21 opera-
tion of nursing homeswas considered to be “activities not linked to the exercise
of official authority… ”22
Norway’s Regulation on public procurement, in force until 1 January 2017,
needs to be briefly explained. In 2004, after an initiative by the Socialist Left
Party, the previous Norwegian regulations on public procurement included
in § 2–1(3)(a) a temporary exemption for “contracts with a non-profit organi-
zation”. In 2006, this was made permanent and incorporated into the Regula-
tion on public procurement. According to one of the interviewees, the exemp-
tion was important,23 but there is no assessment of how much the exemption
has actually been applied by public authorities.24 Moreover, little empirical
18 ESA,Decision 154/17/COL ; the basis were the previous Regulation; in the context of clarifying
the facts a process initiated by the Nursing Home Agency in Oslo in 2016 were communicated
in the dialogue between NHO, ESA, Oslo Municipality and the Norwegian Government (see
notes 61–63); copies of the correspondence betweenOsloMunicipality andNHO and between
NHO and ESA were made available to the author.
19 ESA (2010), Decision No. 248/10/COL, Case No. 66111 and 66744; the ESA decision was ap-
pealed to the EFTA Court (2011), 2011/C 141/12, Case E-13/10 — Aleris Ungplan AS v EFTA
Surveillance Authority, but was found inadmissible.
20 ESA, Decision No. 154/17/COL , 11; see also Sejersted, Rettslig vurdering; Goller, M. (2015),
Handlingsrom for bruk av ideelle organisasjoner, available online at http://ideeltnettverk.
no/sites/ideeltnettverk.no/files/goller_2015-06-16_handlingsrom_for_bruk_av_ideelle_
organisasjoner_-_endelig.pdf
21 ESA, Decision 154/17/COL , 14, specifying that exercise of official authority relates to “use of
force… ” and “autonomous decisional power as to how to deal with minors in critical circum-
stances.”
22 ESA, Decision 154/17/COL , 17.
23 Interview with author on 21 June 2016.
24 Seiersted, F. (2014) Rettslig vurdering av om unntaket for kjøp av helse- og sosialtjenester
fra ideelle organisasjoner kan videreføres, 10, available online at https://www.regjeringen.no/
contentassets/cada61a19bab448ba0c35ba4a0756fcb/sejersted.pdf?id=2271254
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What policy space for diaconal institutions? Challenges frompublic procurement 21
research has been conducted on the particularities of the non-profit sector in
Norway.25
While the exemption is noteworthy, the various Norwegian governments
were generally promoters of more competition and more public procure-
ment. First, by requiring a lower threshold than the EU, namely NOK 500.000
(approximately 56.000 Euro) for when procurement process announcements
must be made.
Second, Norway did not seek to explore alternatives to competitive tender-
ing. Procurement processes, however, are not required for institutions oper-
ating based on agreements signed before the EAA entered into force in 1994.
This is specified by Article 32.5 of Directive 2014/24/EU, saying that in “works
or services consisting in the repetition of similar works or services entrusted
to the economic operator to which the same contracting authorities awarded
an original contract … ” no prior publication is required and contracts can be
continued.
Third, neither the Norwegian Guidelines for Public Procurement nor the
specific Guidelines for Public Procurement of Healthcare and Social Services
specified the wider societal objectives of public procurement, even if a separate
Action Plan was published in 2007.26 The emphasis lies primarily on the con-
ditions in other countries. The General Guidelines describe the wider societal
concerns applying to Norway when describing the rationale for the exemption
in the 2006 Regulation on public procurement.27 In the Specific Guidelines for
Procurement of Healthcare and Social Services, there is a stronger emphasis
on societal concerns, specifically the emphasis of non-profit actors’ on user
involvement as well as civil society and local community involvement, albeit
only in a descriptive manner.28 Various public commissions were reluctant to
take social concerns into account.29 In this context, it is relevant to note that
25 Dalby Trætteberg, H. and K.H. Sivesind (2015), Ideelle organisasjoners særtrekk og merverdi
på helse- og omsorgsfeltet, Senter for forskning på sivilsamfunn og frivillig sektor Rapport
2015-2, Oslo and Bergen, 15; see also Public Commission on pension obligations for non-
profit actors, Ideell opprydding, 32.
26 Norwegian Government (2007), The Norwegian Action Plan on Environmental and So-
cial Responsibility in Public Procurement 2007–2010, available online (short version) at
https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/FAD/Vedlegg/Konkurransepolitikk/T-
1467_eng.pdf
27 Norwegian Government, Veileder , 99, highlighting involvement and collaboration with non-
profit actors.
28 Difi, Veileder , 10.
29 See NOU 1997:21, Public Procurement, Chapter 7, concluding on p. 89 that it does not recom-
mend that social considerations be included in public procurement processes; a slight change
can be seen in NOU 2014:4, Simpler Rules, Better Procurements, 106, which emphasizes the
nature and qualities of non-profit service providers.
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22 Hans Morten Haugen
the EUGuide for social procurement emphasizes the local conditions and sit-
uation for the individual user or beneficiary.30
2. Recent efforts to strengthen the role of the non-profit sector
WhileNorwegian authorities have been cautious to explore and utilize the pol-
icy space that the EAA Agreement might provide, an agreement, two specifi-
cations, and a Plan of action have been adopted by Norwegian authorities.
First, the Cooperation Agreement of 2012 was signed between the govern-
ment and four representatives from the non-profit sector. Under the head-
ing “Parties’ Objectives,” the Agreement reads: “The government and the non-
profit sector shall further develop and improve their cooperation in order to
demonstrate how the uniqueness and qualities of the non-profit sector can be
mobilized to provide the best possible services ...”31 Moreover, six principles
were identified: quality, fiscal efficiency, continuity and predictability, inde-
pendence, diversity, and dialogue. Under the first of these, one bullet point
emphasizes “society’s need for new knowledge of the roles, qualities, and con-
tributions the non-profit actors bring to the development of new healthcare
and social services.”32 The cooperation agreement was extended by the new
government – with the Norwegian Association of Local and Regional Author-
ities as a new party.33
In the first specification in 2011, the then Minister of Health and Care Ser-
vices specified that the regional health authorities must take into account the
need of the non-profit institutions for predictability and a long-term perspec-
tive in their public procurement.34
In the second specification in 2016, applying specifically to care for persons
with drug addiction or a background as sex-workers, the Ministry of Health
and Care Services specified how the EU rules on state aid can be reconciled
with the EU prohibition of discriminatory practices. This is analyzed further
in the section below.
30 EU (2011), Buying Social. A Guide to Taking Account of Social Considerations in Public Pro-
curement, 22 (“identify … local priorities”).
31 Different parties (2012), Samarbeidsavtale om leveranser om helse- og sosialtjenester mel-
lom Regjeringen og Hovedorganisasjonen Virke, Frivillighet Norge, Ideelt Nettverk og KS
Bedrift, 3, available online at https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/fad/vedlegg/
konkurransepolitikk/anskaffelser/samarbeidsavtale.pdf
32 Different parties, Samarbeidsavtale , 4.
33 Different parties (2015), Samarbeidsavtale om leveranser om helse- og sosialtjenester mel-
lom Regjeringen og KS og Hovedorganisasjonen Virke, Frivillighet Norge, Ideelt Nett-
verk og KS Bedrift, available online at https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/15fced4
5f5e34f4ab036cb51c559b532/signert-samarbeidsavtale-med-ideell-sektor.pdf
34 Norwegian Ministry of Minister of Health and Care Services (2011), Langsiktige avtaler med
ideelle organisasjoner, Press Release No. 52/2011 (2 September).
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What policy space for diaconal institutions? Challenges frompublic procurement 23
Finally, a governmental Action Plan was adopted by the present govern-
ment, with the purpose of improving the conditions for the non-profit sector.
Based on these examples, it is justifiable to state that the last Norwegian
governments have been too reluctant to investigate andmake use of the policy
space that the EAAmembership provides. This is also reflected in a Parliament
decision of 1 December 2014 requesting the “government to adopt measures
to improve the non-profit providers’ conditions in procurement processes.”35
A report thatmapped the developments in thewelfaremix in the Scandinavian
countries concluded that
the unique and distinctive options non-profit actors can offer have not been adequately
developed. Thus, the goal of increased diversity and individual adaptation failed to be
achieved.36
Since the uniqueness of non-profit actors is generally acknowledged to be dif-
ficult to determine, most surveys on social and healthcare provision used the
term “private” and did not distinguish between non-profit and for-profit ac-
tors, with relative positive perceptions of private actors.37 There is one recent
exception, however, finding that Norwegians are overall more positive than
Swedes and trust non-profit, for-profit, and public welfare providers.38
In summary, notwithstanding the exception in the Regulation on Public
Procurement, Norway has chosen a relatively strict and non-flexible approach
35 For the decision (No. 52, 2014–2015) and the government’s response, see Ministry of Trade,
Industry and Fisheries (2015), Oppfølging av anmodningsvedtak fra Stortinget, available
online at www.statsbudsjettet.no/Statsbudsjettet-2016/Dokumenter1/Fagdepartementenes-
proposisjoner/Narings–og-handelsdepartementet-NHD/Prop-1-S-/Del-3-Andre-saker-/8-
Oppfolging-av-anmodningsvedtak-fra-Stortinget-
36 Sivesind, K.H (2016), “Mot en ny skandinavisk velferdsmodell?”, in K.H. Sivesind (ed.) Mot
en ny skandinavisk velferdsmodell? , 73. See also presentation of the report in Vårt Land (2016),
Ideelle aktører som sikrer mangfold i velferdstilbudet (5 February). On individual adaptation,
see Dalby Trætteberg and Sivesind 2015, Ideelle organisasjoners særtrekk, 24–26, presuming
that the non-profit actors are both more trusted than for-profit actors, and do attract the most
vulnerable users.
37 The two surveys are discussed in Gautun, H., H. Bogen and A. Skevik Grødem (2013), Kon-
sekvenser av Konkurranseutsetting. Kvalitet, effektivitet og arbeidsvilkår i sykehjem og hjem-
metjenester, Fafo-rapport 2013:24, 26. 1/3 agree with the statement “Can to a greater extent be
operated by private.” The statement applies to public tasks in general and not healthcare and
social services in particular. Moreover, as many agree as disagree (4 out of 10 for both) that
nursing homes are suitable for competitive tendering.
38 Angell, O.H. (2014), “Kyrkan och Välfärden. Svenska uppfatningar i ett norskt perspektiv,” in
A. Bäckström (ed.) Välfärdsinsatsar på religiös grund. Förväntningar och problem, Skellefteå.
The deviant figures on p. 151 occur most likely because the question raised in Norway said
“the church and other religious organizations,” hence including, for instance, Muslim organi-
zations. The deviant figures on p. 160 (human compassion and profit-minded) might occur
because the Church of Norway has beenmuch criticized for its position on same-sexmarriage,
and because Norwegians do not as easily see the distinction between non-profit and for-profit
actors compared to Swedes, where there has been more debate over for-profit actors.
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24 Hans Morten Haugen
to public procurement, but with several policy initiatives to improve the over-
all conditions for non-profit actors.
3. New approach beyond public procurement?
The public procurement directive (2014/24/EU) specifies what might be ex-
cluded from public procurement. Article 12 on contracts with entities within
the public sector (termed “in-house”) has been applied to extend as well to
institutions that have chosen to become part of the public sector. Article 12.1
specifies: (a) that the contracting authority exercises over the legal person con-
cerned a control that is similar to that which it exercises over its own depart-
ments; (b) that more than 80% of the activities of the controlled legal person
are carried out in the performance of the specified tasks; and (c) that there is
no private capital in this controlled legal person. This option has been pre-
ferred by institutions in Denmark, but has not been an option for Norwegian
non-profit actors.39
What is permissible state compensation or state support, as opposed to non-
permissible state aid, and how to understand various forms of services were
clarified by a 2011 Commission Communication, a 2012 Commission Deci-
sion, and a 2016 Commission Notice. Below, I look at what is said about the
nature of particularly social services and the overall societal impact of these
services.40
On the one hand, the EU specifies that “the social nature of a service is not
sufficient in and of itself to classify it as non-economic.”41 Hence, social and
healthcare services are not categorically excluded as economic services. On the
other hand, the EU has another category termed social services of general in-
terest , specified through the “preventive and socially cohesive/inclusive role”
of such services.42
Article 14, the relevant provision of the 2012 TFEU, says that services of
general economic interest, while operating on the basis of “economic and fi-
nancial conditions … ,” are acknowledged as “promoting social and territorial
cohesion … ,” giving competence to EU member states “to provide, to com-
39 Minutes from the meeting between the Norwegian Government, the Norwegian Association
of Local and Regional Authorities, and non-profit actors in healthcare and social services on 10
December 2015, as quoted in Public Commission on pension obligations, Ideell opprydding ,
56n59.
40 For an analysis of the territorial scope and trade-affecting impact of social and health services,
see Haugen, H.M. (2017), “What policy space for diaconal institutions? Challenges from pen-
sions obligations,” in P. Launonen and M. Valtonen (eds.) Diaconia in Dialogue – The Chal-
lenges of Diversifying Contexts. Diak and Working Life series.
41 EU Commission, Communication II , 4, note referring to specific ECJ cases omitted.
42 EUCommission,Communication II , 4, note referring to a previous EUCommunication omit-
ted.
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What policy space for diaconal institutions? Challenges frompublic procurement 25
mission and to fund such services.” In the 2011 Communication, EUmember
states are given discretion, so that “tailor-made solutions can be found to con-
crete and specific problems in different sectors… ”43 This discretion must be
presumed to be wide in the realm of provision of social services of general
interest, as their contribution to social cohesion and social inclusion are ex-
plicitly recognized.
Hence, while prohibiting state aid, the EU/EEA does not exclude state sup-
port or long-term contracts with certain service providers, given that such
support does not favor certain undertakings over others. This is further spec-
ified in an EU Guide on social services of general interest,44 and an ESA State
aid guidelines particularly applying to services of general economic interest.45
As elaborated in another article,46 the prohibition against state aid (Arti-
cle 61 EEA, similar to Article 107 TFEU) hinges upon the definition of “un-
dertaking,” not preventing state compensation if the amount of support is fair
in relation to the cost of producing the given service, as done by a fairly effi-
cient undertaking.47
The EU Commission specified in a 2016 Notice that, when public support
was not liable to affect trade, this applied to “hospitals and other healthcare
facilities providing the usual range of medical services aimed at a local pop-
ulation and unlikely to attract customers or investment from other Member
States.”48 Hence, the characteristics of the service provider are relevant.More-
over, a 2012 decision refers to hospitals and undertakings in charge of social
services as exempt from a notification requirement.49
43 EU Commission, Communication II , 5. For references to social cohesion , see 2 and 14; for
references to social inclusion , see 6, 8, 12; see also EU Commission, Communication I , 2, 3,
101.
44 EU Commission (2011), Guide on application of EU rules to Services of General Economic
Interest and in particular to Social Services of General Interest, Brussels.
45 ESA (n. d.), Compensation granted for the provision of services of general economic inter-
est, available online at www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid-guidelines/Part-VI—Compensation-
granted-for-the-provision-of-services-of-general-economic-interest.pdf
46 Haugen, “What policy space II.”
47 EU Commission (2012), Commission Decision 2012/21/EU on State aid in the form of public
service compensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of ser-
vices of general economic interest, preambular paragraph 4, deriving from the ECJ decision
in Altmark (C-280/00 Altmark Trans and RegierungspräsidiumMagdeburg v Nahverkehrsge-
sellschaft Altmark [2003] ECR I-7747) four cumulative criteria for when public service com-
pensation does not constitute State aid; see also Public Commission on pension obligations,
Ideell opprydding , 52–54 (assessing exemptions under the EEA).
48 EU Commission (2016) Commission Notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Arti-
cle 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, C/2016/2946, paragraph
197(c).
49 Community Decision 2012/21/EU on State aid in the form of public service compensation
granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic
interest, Article 2.1(c); see also preambular paragraph 11. The decision provides an exemption
to the overall obligation under Article 108(3) TFEU to notify the EU Commission of any plans
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26 Hans Morten Haugen
Hence, it is fully possible for EU/EEA member states to fund undertakings
providing services of general interest. These services can be either economic
services or non-economic services, though only economic services are covered
by the internal market and competition rules of the Treaty.50 The EU Com-
missiondefines services of general economic interest as “economic activities
which deliver outcomes in the overall public good that would not be supplied
… by the market without public intervention.”51
Non-economic services, in essence the exercising of official authority, are
not covered by the overall right of establishment, in accordancewithArticle 32
EEA. Provision of such services are “only subject to the general principles of
the EU (transparency, non-discrimination, equal treatment, proportionality)
without stipulation of any specific procedures.”52 A service that involves legit-
imate use of force, for instance psychiatric treatment services or child welfare
services, represents the exercise of official authority,53 As noted by the Public
Commission on pension obligations for non-profit actors, however, there has
been relatively little use of the official authority exemption in the context of
public procurement.54
4. New Approach to Public Procurement?
Public procurement processes take place in the market, but the emphasis on
price versus other concerns is determined by the public body announcing the
procurement process. We saw above that the Norwegian authorities might
have been too cautious when including social considerations in public pro-
curement processes, though there is a clear recognition of the overall contri-
bution of the non-profit organizations, including diaconal actors. The Nor-
wegian Act on public procurement was influenced by jurisprudence from the
ECJ and various policy initiativeswithinNorway.One of the interviewees said:
“I never thought that we would come to where we have come today.”55 Com-
pared to the situation in 2013–2015, when many of the diaconal institutions
to grant or alter aid, obligating a delay of any proposedmeasures until their compatibility with
the internal market obligations has been decided by the EU Commission.
50 EU Commission, Communication II , 3.
51 EU Commission, Communication II , 3.
52 European Centre of Employers and Enterprises providing Public Services (2013), The Ac-
quis Communautaire for Services of General Economic Interest, 2, available online at
www.ceep.eu/images/stories/ceep_acquis_glossary.pdf
53 For arguments that exercising official authority also applies to nursing homes, see the Nursing
Home Agency in Oslo and Virke Ideell, note 61 and accompanying text.
54 Public Commission on pension obligations for non-profit actors, 51; for a general presentation
on the concept of official authority, saying that it has a narrow application, see ibid, 50.
55 Interview with author on 29 June 2016.
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What policy space for diaconal institutions? Challenges frompublic procurement 27
feared that they would lose out in the competition with for-profit actors,56
there is currently optimism.
Before reviewing the ECJ jurisprudence and the Norwegian process, we
would like to analyze the most important provision of the new EU Directive
(2014/24/EU). As early as 2011 the EU Commission said that it would pro-
pose “a significant reform on the rules of public procurement and concessions
… ”57 with a “lighter regime” applying to social and health services. It must be
remembered, however, that the previous Directive (2004/18/EC) listed health
and social services as non-prioritized. The distinction between prioritized and
non-prioritized services was discontinued in the new directive.
The “light touch regime” is found in Articles 74 to 77 of the new directive.
Of greatest relevance is Article 76.2, which reads:
Member States shall ensure that contracting authoritiesmay take into account the need to
ensure quality, continuity, accessibility, affordability, availability and comprehensiveness
of the services, the specific needs of different categories of users, including disadvantaged
and vulnerable groups, the involvement and empowerment of users and innovation.
Quality is also emphasized in the subsequent sentence, specifying that the
choice of provider shall be made based on a price-quality ratio. Maybe even
more important is continuity. As seen above,58 33 out of 38 nursing homes op-
erating under a municipal contract were sold or restructured during the con-
tract period. This is the opposite of continuity. While organizational changes
might take place also in the non-profit sector, these changes are usually mi-
nor. On the other hand, it might be difficult to distinguish between non-profit
and commercial service providers on the three A’s (accessibility, affordability,
availability). Regarding the comprehensiveness of the services and the specific
needs of users, it is an open question whether this will be more easily accom-
plished by non-profit actors. However, these organizations do have a strong
tradition, at least in Norway, of promoting involvement and empowerment of
users, as well as innovation. There is no doubt that this provision allows for
a wider policy space for health and social services compared to other public
procurements.59
56 Klassekampen (2013), “Frelsesarmeen bønnfaller Erna” (The Salvation Army pleads Erna) (1
October); Vårt Land (2015), “Nye EU-regler truer ideell omsorg” (New EU rules threatens
non-profit care) (12 October).
57 EU Commission, Communication II , 7.
58 Herning, Konkurranseutsatte sykehjem .
59 Fløistad, K. (2017), Utredning av handlingsrommet for bruk av ideelle leverandører av helse-
og sosialtjenester, 12; available online at https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/8dfcb07f9
1a84a7cacd2b8f14afe84cf/0900sv_22376.pdf2009637.pdf. This legal opinion was promised by
the Minister in the debate in the Parliament; see Norwegian Parliament (2016), Minutes from
meeting 9 June 2016, at 3393, available online at https://www.stortinget.no/globalassets/pdf/
referater/stortinget/2015-2016/s160609.pdf
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28 Hans Morten Haugen
As may be seen above,60 social cohesion and social inclusion were empha-
sized in the 2011 EU Commission communications, but neither of the terms
is included in the new directive. It was, however, the previous EU directive
that applied in Norway when the Nursing Home Agency in Oslo in 2016 an-
nounced a procurement process for building and running up to five nursing
homes for 30 years – but only for non-profit actors. When justifying that only
non-profit actors were eligible to participate, the Agency argued that running
nursing homes represented “exercise of official authority.”61
The ESAhas asked theNorwegian government if they agreewith this under-
standing and has askedOsloMunicipality to suspend the procurement process
awaiting such clarification.62 TheNursingHomeAgency inOslo has, however,
reiterated its position, and has proceededwith the process butwas stopped by a
2018 decision from the office of the City Recorder in Oslo.63 As we saw above,
the ESA stated its decision concerning theDirectorate for Children, Youth and
Family Affairs that operating nursing homes was not linked to the exercise of
official authority.64 Surprisingly little is said about exercise of official author-
ity in a Guide on how to reserve procurement processes to non-profit actors
in the realm of health and social welfare services.65
Moreover, two judgments applying the previous directive (2004/18/EC)
opened a policy space allowing contracts to be entered into without procure-
ment processes.66 First, the services must be “performed by non-profit orga-
nizations or associations … ” Second, the non-profit actor must contribute to
the social purpose and the pursuit of the objectives of the good of the commu-
nity. Third, there must be compliance with budgetary efficiency.67
60 EU Commission, Communication I and Communication II , note 43 and accompanying text.
61 Anbud 365 (2017), Oslo–anskaffelse forbeholdt ideelle granskes av EFTAs overvåkingsor-
gan (31 January). In a letter of 11 January 2017 to NHO Service, the Nursing Home
Agency in Oslo specified that exercise of official authority – operationalized as use of
force, as specified in Ch. 4A of the Health & Rights Act (pasient- og brukerrettighet-
sloven) – applies to nursing homes; see also legal opinion by Virke Ideell (2016), No-
tat. Offentlige innkjøp av helse- og sosialtjenester fra ideell sektor, 8–9, available on-
line at https://www.virke.no/globalassets/bransje/bransjedokumenter/virke-ideell-offentlige-
innkjop-fra-ideell-sektor.pdf.
62 Anbud 365 (2017), Overvåkingsorgan setter strenge vilkår for Oslo i omstridt klagesak (22
February).
63 Anbud 365 (2017), Oslo viker ikke en tomme for EFTAS overvåkingsorgan i omstridt anskaf-
felse (5 April); see also Anbud 365 (2017), Til forsvar for omstridt anskaffelse i Oslo kommune
(21 June). The decision – 17-185662TVI-OBYF (on file with the author) – said that the exclu-
sion of PRK Helse from the procurement process, as it was allegedly not a non-profit actor,
was unjustified.
64 ESA, Decision No. 154/17/COL , 17.
65 Norwegian Government (2017), Ny uttalelse om ideelle aktører, available online at
https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/ny-uttalelse-om-ideelle-aktorer/id2575688.
66 ECJ (2014), Spezzino et al., C-113/13; ECJ (2016), Costa et al., C-50/14. All four scholarly arti-
cles in the same issue (1/2016; Vol 11) of European Procurement & Public Private Partnership
Law Review give a very critical assessment of the Spezzino judgment.
67 ECJ, Spezzino , paras. 60 and 63; ECJ, Costa , para. 63.
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Both “social purpose” and “the good of the community” are broad terms,
but diaconal, non-profit actors do contribute to these objectives. While the
rationale behind public procurement is tomake themost efficient use of public
money, the current Norwegian Minister of Health and Care Services wrote
that his Ministry is positive toward public procurement processes where the
price is set and where only quality criteria are decisive.68
When the Government proposed a new act on public procurement in 2015,
there was limited awareness of the actual space provided by the new EUDirec-
tive. Less than one page was devoted to non-profit actors providing healthcare
and social services. Many of the above-mentioned factors as well as the 2014
legal opinion and the 2015 Agreement were referred to.69 More surprising,
while the need for continuity and stability was mentioned explicitly, the leg-
islative proposal made no reference to Article 76.2 of the Directive.
Non-profit actors expressed their concern, and this concern was shared by
Norwegian parliamentarians. Two parliamentary initiatives were presented
before the new act came up for discussion. First, a proposal in 2014 that con-
tracts in the child welfare services shall be limited to non-profit actors (“skjer-
mede anbud”),70 which did not garner the support of a majority of the Parlia-
ment.
Second, while a proposal in the Parliament from 2016 resulted in a unani-
mous decision that the government shall set a target for the share of non-profit
sector within 2030 and present a plan to achieve this,71 a decision by the Oslo
City Council was more ambitious: It specified a strategy to strengthen non-
profit actors, namely, that 25% of all healthcare shall be provided by the non-
profit sector within 2025, against the votes of the Social Liberal, Conservative
and Progress Party. The same parties did not approve that the policy space
“shall be utilized as far as possible” when contracts with for-profit actors ex-
pire or new contracts are entered into, but all parties voted for a “strategy on
how to strengthen the non-profit actors in Oslo’s welfare services.”72 The 25%
68 Høie, B. (2016), “De ideelle organisasjoner styrkes,” Vårt Land (5 February). This is contrasted
with a public procurement process in child-welfare services, where the second round of allo-
cating places was basedmerely on price and not on content or quality, a process to which three
of my interviewees on 21 June 2016 had objections.
69 Norwegian Government (2015), Prop. 51 L (2015–2016). Lov om offentlige anskaffelser, 75.
On the 2014 legal opinion, see note 24; on the 2015 Agreement, see note 33.
70 Norwegian Parliament (2014), Innst. 190 S (2013–2014), Proposal to the Parliament from the
Standing Committee on Family and Culture Affairs.
71 Norwegian Parliament (2016), Innst. 102 S (2016–2017) from the Standing Committee on
Health and Care Services; the original proposal proposed a share of 25% by 2030; see Rep-
resentantforslag 8:85 S (2015–2016).
72 Oslo City Council (2016), Sak med innstilling fra helse- og sosialkomiteen, Sak 304
16/01749 of 16 November 2016, available online at https://www.oslo.kommune.
no/dok/Bystyret/2016_11/1171468_1_1.PDF. All documents are available online at
https://www.oslo.kommune.no/sru/utv_caseinfo.asp?utvalg=B&caseno=1085412&dayno=
304&Year=2016-11-16&db_source=2.
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30 Hans Morten Haugen
share by 2025 was originally a proposal from a Public Commission submitting
its report in 2011.73 As seen above, this share is approximately 9% today.
When the debate on implementing the EUdirectives inNorwegian law took
place in the Parliament in early June 2016, ensuring the interests of non-profit
actors providing healthcare and social services became the most topical issue.
To justify a particular approach to non-profit actors, ten separate reasons were
given, including competence, engagement, trust, diversity, continuity, and in-
novation, almost all of which were repeated by the Minister in the debate.74
The outcome was a new addition to the Norwegian law on public procure-
ment, Section 7a, reading as follows:
The Ministry shall issue regulations for procurement of health and social services. The
Ministry shall when formulating the regulations particularly emphasize the characteris-
tics of health and social services. The regulations shall promote important concerns such
as diversity, quality, continuity and user involvement.
We recognize terms from Article 76.2 of the EU directive. However, the terms
“accessibility, affordability, availability, and comprehensiveness… ” as well as
“specific needs” and “innovation” were not included. Hence, the Norwegian
law is not as comprehensive as the EU directive. Moreover, a proposal specify-
ing that contractors be allowed to limit the procurement process to non-profit
actors did not receive support from the majority.75 As shown in the 2017 legal
opinion, there is no prohibition in EU law to limit procurement processes to
non-profit actors, provided that this exists in domestic legislation.76
The Regulation on public procurement does, however, emphasize the users’
need with regard to quality, continuity, competence, experience and partic-
ipation, as well as the overall need for innovation, among others.77 This are
criteria that non-profit actorsmeet, and thesemust be emphasized in the spec-
ifications when announcing the procurement processes.
The Minister made promises that Norway shall attempt to widen the possi-
bilities under Article 77 of Directive 2014/24/EU to reserve contracts for cer-
tain services, when this provision is up for review in 2019.78
73 Public Commission on Innovation in Care (2011), NOU 2011:11 Innovasjon i omsorg, 17.
74 Norwegian Parliament (2016), Innst. 358 L (2015–2016) from the Standing Committee on
Business and Industry, 19–20; for the minister’s comments, see Norwegian Parliament 2016,
3391–3392, see also NOU 2014:4, 107–108 (giving eight distinctive qualities).
75 Norwegian Parliament 2016 (proposal), 28.
76 Fløistad,Utredning , 25. She finds on p. 26 that the new directive does not set a higher threshold
than the previous directive regarding the possibilities for limiting procurement processes to
non-profit actors; but specifies on p. 28 that tender competitions must be open to non-profit
actors in all EEA states; for ESA jurisprudence; see notes 18 and 19.
77 Norwegian Regulation 974 on public procurement (adopted 8 August 2016; in force 1 January
2017), section 30-1(3); see also Section 30-1(5) on long-term contracts for specific purposes.
78 Norwegian Parliament 2016 (debate), 3399.
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When the Parliamentary Committee presented its proposal to the Parlia-
ment, the title of one Norwegian newspaper was: “Legislative Amendment Se-
cures Non-Profit Actors.”79 This positive assessment came 2 months before
a decision that was even more decisive for the non-profit actors: the old and
continuing pensions obligations.80
5. Conclusion
Both the current and the previous governments of Norway can justifiably be
criticized for not having donemore to explore the policy space within the EEA
obligations. Initiatives from the government on ways to “improve their work-
ing together” did not lead to an overall predictability for non-profit actors.
Non-profit institutions’ overall contribution to the society were emphasized
by neither the current nor the former Norwegian government, and the pos-
sibilities for excepting services involving the exercise of official authority was
not highlighted, despite the fact that the EU directives and various communi-
cations and guidelines allowed for this.
The comingGuide to assist in reserving procurement processes in the realm
of health and social welfare service will be important.81 This Guide should
specify the qualities that the tenderer must comply with, as specified by Arti-
cle 76.2 of Directive 2014/24/EU and Article 30-1(3) of the Norwegian Reg-
ulation on public procurement. Primarily emphasizing that a broad range
of health and social welfare services represent “exercise of official authority”
might not convince ESA.
The 2017 legal opinion will be useful, however. It clarified that the social
and healthcare services can be treated differently from other services, allowing
states to reserve procurement processes to non-profit actors, but the character
of these services must be taken into account.82 Such tender competitions can-
not, however, exclude any non-profit service providers from any EEA country.
It is interesting that two of the three parties that did not support the word-
ing in the Oslo City Council to utilize the policy space,83 will issue a Guide
on how to reserve procurement processes to non-profit actors. This will chal-
lenge them to explore further the policy space within the legal space formed
by Norwegian EEA obligations.
79 Vårt Land (2016), Lovendring sikrer ideelle (3 June).
80 See Haugen, “What policy space II.” Partial implementation was proposed by the government
in the 2018 budget proposal, but the proposal was not approved by the Parliament, as more
clarifications were required.
81 Norwegian Government, Ny uttalelse .
82 Fløistad, Utredning , 29.
83 Oslo City Council, Sak .
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